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The Learnability Criterion and Monetary Policy
James B. Bullard
only if expectations are consistent with actual
outcomes. But, how is it that economic actors
could come to possess rational expectations if
they do not initially possess detailed knowledge
concerning the nature of equilibrium in the
economy or economic situation in which they
find themselves?1
Several key papers in the 1980s, including
Bray (1982), Evans (1985), Lucas (1987), and
Marcet and Sargent (1989a,b), explored an idea
concerning one resolution of this question. The
idea was that, indeed, economic actors cannot be
expected to initially know the nature of the equi-
librium of the economy in which they operate.
Instead, they have a perception of the equilibrium
law of motion, and they use available data gener-
ated by the economy itself to update their per-




n a number of recent papers, economists
have begun to analyze the stability of rational
expectations equilibria under learning in
microfounded models of monetary policy. Most
of these analyses have been in versions of the
New Keynesian macroeconomics, as presented
most prominently by Woodford (2003a). The goal
of this paper is to provide a brief, largely non-
technical survey of some, but not all, of this work
and to point out connections to some related
research.
Origins
Learning has been an issue in macroeconomics
since the rational expectations revolution swept
the field in the 1970s and 1980s. Rational expec-
tations has long been understood as a modeling
device: When studying economic outcomes, we
economists should think of them as equilibria
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1 Some of the tenor of the earlier, feisty debate on this question is
conveyed by the following quote from an influential paper by
Stephen DeCanio (1979, p. 52, italics in original): “Thus, direct
computation of rational expectations by flesh-and-blood agents in
an actual market situation is impossible in practice.”
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ceived law of motion come to coincide with the
actual law of motion of the economy, a rational
expectations equilibrium will have been attained.
The economic actors will have “learned” the
rational expectations equilibrium.
This idea also has an appealing practical inter-
pretation. In an actual macroeconomic environ-
ment, expectations of all of the key players are
influenced by the expectations of the forecasting
community. The forecasting community uses
econometric models of the economy, recursively
updated. Thus, it is not too far-fetched to think
that a dynamic like the one described is powerful
and at work in observed macroeconomies.
The question of whether such a process will
actually converge or not is technically demanding
because, in economic models, beliefs concerning
the future help determine actual values of key
variables; but, under learning, these same values
are used in the recursive updating and so feed
back into the generation of updated beliefs. It is
not at all clear how such a system should be
expected to behave. The findings of Marcet and
Sargent (1989a,b) on this question were revised,
extended, and explored in a series of papers by
George Evans and Seppo Honkapohja during the
1990s. Much of that effort is discussed in the land-
mark book by Evans and Honkapohja (2001),
where they present a complete theory of the effects
of recursive learning in macroeconomic environ-
ments. One theme of their theory is that local con-
vergence in such systems can often be assessed
by calculating a certain expectational stability
(E-stability) condition, viewing the mapping from
the perceived law of motion to the actual law of
motion as a differential equation in notional
time. They show the conditions under which the
stability of this differential equation governs the
stability of the system under real-time recursive
learning.2 These conditions are generally quite
weak, and so many authors now routinely calcu-
late expectational stability conditions as a means
of assessing stability under recursive learning in
models of interest.
A Minimal Criterion
It is important to stress that the idea of stability
under recursive learning—learnability—just out-
lined can be viewed as a “minimal deviation from
rational expectations” approach to this question.
The agents in the model are endowed with a per-
ceived law of motion which, in most cases, corre-
sponds in form to the equilibrium law of motion
for that economy. Thus, the agents are given the
correct specification for their recursively estimated
vector autoregressions that they use to forecast
the future. In addition, the theorems are local in
nature, so that we think of the systems as initially
quite near the rational expectations equilibrium.
And, the agents are passive updaters—they simply
update the coefficients in their model as new data
are produced. Convergence hinges on whether
initially small expectational errors are damped
or magnified as the economy evolves. One inter-
pretation of this is that the situation is very favor-
able to allowing the agents to learn the rational
expectations equilibrium. If the equilibrium can-
not be learned even under these very favorable
conditions, then one might be quite pessimistic
about the possibility of observing such an equi-
librium in an actual economy. Thus, the learnabil-
ity criterion can be viewed as a minimal stability
condition that any reasonable equilibrium should
be required to meet.
What Has Been Learned So Far?
The main messages of the learning literature
to date are not difficult to summarize. First and
foremost, it is possible in many macroeconomic
environments that recursive learning as described
above can produce a dynamic that converges to
a rational expectations equilibrium. So, some
rational expectations equilibria are indeed learn-
able in this sense. Some initial thinking on this
issue suggested that a general case could be made
for nonconvergence, and thus that rational expec-
tations equilibrium was not a useful concept. But
that argument has been dispelled.
A second message, however, is that not all
rational expectations equilibria are learnable.
Some, in fact, are unstable under the recursive
learning dynamic. Furthermore, because this con-
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2 The systems under real-time learning are stochastic difference
equations with time-varying coefficients.ception of recursive learning involves a minimal
deviation from rational expectations, the unlearn-
able equilibria are particularly suspect as descrip-
tions of actual economies. One certainly has the
impression from much of the economics profes-
sion that all rational expectations equilibria are
somehow learnable,3 but it turns out not to be true.
It is perhaps not hard to imagine now that, for
systems like this, the feedback could be too strong
and expectational errors could be amplified.
The state of affairs is thus that some rational
expectations equilibria are learnable while others
are not. Furthermore, convergence will in general
depend on all the economic parameters of a given
system, including the policy parameters (that is,
it depends on the entire economic structure).
Therefore, an important additional message is that
policy can have an impact on whether a targeted
rational expectations equilibrium is learnable or
not. Policymakers therefore may wish to take into
account how a particular policy choice might
influence the stability of a targeted equilibrium.
This feature of the recent literature has generated
considerable interest.
One additional message is that there appears
to be no clear, general relation between conditions
for learnability and conditions for determinacy
of rational expectations equilibrium. I will discuss
this issue briefly below.
Alternative Formulations of Learning
In a recent after-dinner speech, eminent
economist Charles Goodhart remarked that, in his
opinion, most learning in a large macroeconomy
comes not from statistical regression of any kind,
but from information passed from person to per-
son. Goodhart said, “You ask your uncle.”4 That
comment certainly rings true and echoes a long-
standing criticism of the learning literature as I
have described it. But learning along this line has
also been pursued in the macroeconomics and
finance literature.
A key aspect of the Goodhart comment is
that important economic judgment travels from
person to person, leaving different people in the
population with different beliefs most of the time.
As an example, consider an individual decision
that has important implications for macroeco-
nomics: How much should a household save out
of current income, and how should savings be
allocated among available assets? It seems unde-
niable that in actual economies, households obtain
information to help them answer these questions
by asking those around them and by obtaining
professional advice. Households with similar
characteristics often have very different savings
strategies. This would seem to conflict with most
models, in which behavior and expectations are
homogeneous.
The artificial intelligence literature has pro-
duced some models that can address some of
these issues.5 The ones that have been investigated
in economic contexts are often variants of genetic
algorithms. Some prominent examples in the liter-
ature include Marimon, McGrattan, and Sargent
(1990) and Arifovic (1996). In these models, a
standard economic environment is assumed, but
agents are allowed to hold initially diverse beliefs
concerning a key future variable, such as an
expected rate of return on an asset. Agents then
make optimal decisions given their expectations,
which, aggregated over all of the agents in the
economy, produces some actual outcomes—prices
and quantities—for the current period. Agent
beliefs are then updated using genetic operators.
These operators draw on evolutionary principles.
First, beliefs that deliver low utility to their owners
tend to get replaced with beliefs that deliver higher
utility. In addition, agents experiment with alter-
native beliefs, either ones that are mixes of their
own and those of other agents in the economy,6
called crossover, or simply by means of a random
change in belief, called mutation. With a new set
of beliefs in place, new decisions are made, and
new outcomes are produced. The question is then:
Will such a process converge to a rational expec-
tations equilibrium of the model? 
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3 This seems to be the message in Lucas (1987).
4 I am paraphrasing a portion of the remarks by Goodhart (2003).
5 Heterogeneity and learning have been addressed outside the arti-
ficial intelligence literature as well. See, for instance, Branch and
Evans (2006), Giannitsarou (2003), and Guse (2005).
6 This operator relates to Goodhart’s comment.The papers in the evolutionary learning liter-
ature for macroeconomics tend to be computa-
tional, as few analytical results are available. The
short answer is that, yes, processes like the one I
have described can converge to rational expecta-
tions equilibria of well-defined models. And again,
not all rational expectations equilibria are stable
under this type of learning dynamic.7 The genetic
algorithm approach departs from the “minimal
deviation from rational expectations” ideal of
the recursive learning literature and asks the
learning dynamic to describe a global search for
equilibrium from initial agent behavior that might
be nearly random. In this sense, the approach is
much more ambitious. It is also more attractive
as a model of the type of social learning that seem-
ingly takes place every day in observed macro-
economies. The genetic algorithm approach also
puts heavy emphasis on how information diffuses
across households in an economy. The nature of
the information diffusion is based on the proper-
ties of the genetic operators that are assumed.8
Relation to Behavioral Finance
Sometimes learning is mentioned in conjunc-
tion with the burgeoning behavioral finance litera-
ture.9 The behavioral finance approach draws on
psychology, especially experiments with human
subjects, to document behavior patterns. Take the
following case of subjects who undergo observa-
tion in psychological studies. They may seem to
be persistently pessimistic, for example, during
the course of the study. The literature would then
seek to postulate these behaviors in models to
see whether apparent anomalies in financial data
can then be explained.10 The behavioral finance
approach, then, is quite different from the learn-
ing literature as I have described it. The macro-
economics learning literature asks how rational
expectations could come about, allowing that
agents behave optimally given their expectations.
The behavioral finance literature seeks to under-
stand the empirical implications of postulating
certain types of seemingly irrational, but labora-
tory documented, behavior on the part of market
participants. A natural question, and one that is
sometimes asked, is whether the seemingly irra-
tional behavior can survive over a long period
of time or whether instead market participants
would learn the rational behavior. Thus, learning
is often mentioned in conjunction with behavioral





Consider a small, closed, New Keynesian
economy described by Woodford (1999 and
2003a) and Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999): 
(1)          
(2)                        
These equations are derived from a model in
which each infinitely lived member of a contin-
uum of household-firms produces a differentiated
good using labor alone, but consumes an aggregate
of all goods in the economy. The household-firms
price their good under a constraint on the fre-
quency of price change. The first-order conditions
for the consumption problem yield equation (1)
while those for the pricing problem yield equation
(2). The variable πt is the percentage-point time-t
deviation of inflation from a fixed target value; zt
is the output gap, also in percentage points; rt
n is
an exogenous shock, usually thought of as being
serially correlated; and rt is the deviation of the
short-term nominal interest rate from the value
consistent with inflation at target and which is
under the control of the monetary authority. The
parameter β is the common discount factor of the
households, σ  relates to the elasticity of inter-
temporal substitution in consumption of the
πκ β π ttt t zÊ =+ +1.
zÊ z rÊ r tt t tt t t
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7 The Arifovic (1996) paper, for instance, describes a process that
does not converge and instead produces endogenously fluctuating
exchange rates.
8 For a survey of this literature, see Arifovic (2000).
9 For one summary of work in behavioral finance, see Vissing-
Jorgensen (2004).
10 These ideas are not so new; see the volume by Hogarth and Reder
(1987).household, and κ relates to the degree of price
stickiness in the economy. These parameters are
argued to be invariant to contemplated changes
in policy. Bullard and Mitra (2002) view the infla-
tion target and the long-run level of output as zero.
The notation E ˆ
t is meant to indicate a possibly
nonrational expectation taken using information
available at date t, so that Et without the hat is
the normal expectations operator.11 To close the
model, one might postulate a simple monetary
policy feedback rule of the type discussed by
Taylor (1993) and analyzed in the large literature
since that paper was published. One could write
such a rule as
(3)                         
where ϕπ and ϕz are nonnegative and not both
equal to zero. The parameters in the policy rule
are particularly interesting as they may have an
impact on the nature of the rational expectations
equilibrium of the model, and they may also have
an impact on the ability of the private sector agents
to learn a rational expectations equilibrium.
One interesting feature of this model is that
expectations enter on the right-hand side of equa-
tions (1) and (2). This is a consequence of the
microfoundations, in which the household-firms
are forward-looking in deciding today’s consump-
tion and today’s prices. This would seem to be an
inescapable consequence of the microfounded
approach; therefore, we might expect all monetary
policy models to have this feature in some form,
and thus that the type of analysis discussed below
should apply to a wide variety of models of mone-
tary policy and not only to the simple example
given here.
Bullard and Mitra (2002) studied the model
(1)-(3) under both a rational expectations assump-
tion and under a learning assumption using the
approach of Evans and Honkapohja (2001). Under
rational expectations, a key question is whether
rational expectations equilibrium is unique, a.k.a.
rz tt z t =+ ϕπ ϕ π ,
determinate. To calculate determinacy properties,
substitute (3) into (1) and write the resulting
system in matrix form as
(4)                   
with yt = [zt,πt]′, α = 0,  is a conformable matrix
that is not needed in the calculations below, and 
(5)       
Both zt and πt are free variables in this system,
and so both eigenvalues of B need to be inside
the unit circle for determinacy to hold.12 Bullard
and Mitra (2002) show that the condition for
determinacy is
(6)                       
This condition is a statement of the Taylor prin-
ciple, as discussed by Woodford (2001 and 2003a).
From equation (2), a permanent increase in infla-
tion increases the output gap by (1 – β)/κ percent-
age points. Then, given equation (3), the left-hand
side of (6) can be interpreted as the extent of the
long-run increase in the nominal interest rate in
response to a permanent change in inflation. The
condition (6) states that this response must be
greater than 1, that is, that nominal interest rates
must rise more than one-for-one with inflation to
achieve determinacy of equilibrium.
Even when determinacy obtains, however, the
question of learnability still needs to be decided.
To calculate learnability, Bullard and Mitra (2002)
postulated a perceived law of motion for the
private sector given by
(7)                             
where a is a 2 × 1 vector and c is a 2 × 2 matrix.
This perceived law of motion corresponds in form
to the minimal state variable solution to equation
(4) and thus endows the agents with the correct
specification of the rational expectations equilib-
rium. Under this perceived law of motion, agent
expectations are given by



























yB Ê y r tt t t
n =+ + ℵ + α 1 ,
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11 The microfoundations of the model were developed assuming
rational expectations. Preston (2005) has argued that these equa-
tions would change under some interpretations of the microfounda-
tions when agents are learning. But Evans, Honkapohja, and Mitra
(2003) have argued that, under some reasonable assumptions, these
equations would remain unaltered.
12 Blanchard and Kahn (1980).(8)                        
where ρ is the serial correlation parameter for the
shock rt
n. Substituting equation (8) into equation
(4) yields the actual law of motion given the per-
ceptions in equation (7), namely,
(9)                    
Equations (7) and (9), the perception and the
reality, respectively, together define a map, T, as
(10)                  
Expectational stability is determined by the matrix
differential equation
(11)                
If the differential equation (11) is asymptotically
stable at the fixed point (a –,c –) the system is said
to be expectationally stable.
A key result in Bullard and Mitra (2002) is to
show that the condition for expectational stability
in this system is exactly the inequality (6). As has
d
d
ac T ac ac
τ
,, , . () = () −()
Ta c B a B c ,, . () =+ ℵ () ρ
yB aB c r tt
n =+ + ℵ () ρ .
Ey a cr tt t
n
+ =+ 1 ρ , been argued, this condition corresponds exactly
to the Taylor principle applied to this system.
Thus, the Taylor principle delivers both deter-
minacy and learnability for a standard New
Keynesian model.13 It would seem to be good
advice to give to policymakers, both from the
point of view of uniqueness of equilibrium and
from the point of view of achievability of that
equilibrium, that they adopt the Taylor principle
in selecting a particular policy rule—values for
ϕπ and ϕz—in this model.
This key result is summarized in Figure 1
from Bullard and Mitra (2002), where parameter
values other than those in the policy rule have
been set at the calibration values recommended
by Woodford (1999). The message of Figure 1 is
that, so long as the monetary authority chooses a
pair of values, ϕπ and ϕz, that are sufficiently large,
or “aggressive,” then the economy will possess
an equilibrium that is both unique and learnable.
Should the policymaker choose values in such a
Bullard
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13 For some further discussion of the connections between the con-













Policy Rules with Contemporaneous Data
NOTE: Regions of determinacy and expectational stability for the class of policy rules using contemporaneous data. Parameters other
than ϕπ and ϕz are set at baseline values. Reprinted with permission from Bullard and Mitra (2002).way that the Taylor principle (6) is violated, then
determinacy does not obtain and unexpected
outcomes may arise. Among the pairs of ϕπ and
ϕz that deliver determinacy and learnability,
policymakers can apply other criteria, such as
the expected utility of the representative house-
hold, to decide on an optimal policy.
More information can be gleaned from
Figure 1, however. Under rational expectations,
once one demonstrates that a determinate equilib-
rium exists, there is little further to discuss, other
than the quantitative nature of the equilibrium
itself. Under learning, however, there is more to
the story, because even within the determinate
and learnable region, the choice of the parameters
in the policy rule will influence the speed with
which the private sector can learn the rational
expectations equilibrium. This issue has been
analyzed in Ferrero (2004). Some policy choices
may involve learning times that are extremely
long, and hence policymakers may wish to think
twice about adopting them.
Figure 1 would seem to suggest that determi-
nacy and learnability go hand in hand, but this
is not the case. Consider the alternative policy
rule defined by
(12)                    
Here the monetary authority reacts to last period’s
values of inflation deviations and the output gap,
perhaps because of realistic information lags. As
McCallum (1999) has emphasized, central banks
do not observe inflation or the output gap in the
same quarter in which they must make decisions
regarding their short-term nominal interest rate
target. Bullard and Mitra (2002) show that this
case is more complicated and in fact that the
conditions for determinacy and learnability do
not align. This result is shown in Figure 2. The
conclusion is that determinacy does not imply
learnability. The darkest region in the figure indi-
cates a situation where the policy rule generates
determinacy, but not learnability.
The policy rules that have been considered
so far have the monetary authority reacting to
current or past developments concerning key
economic variables. But one might imagine that
central banks are forward-looking, so that they
rz tt z t =+ −− ϕπ ϕ π 11 .
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Policy Rules with Lagged Data
NOTE: Determinacy and learnability for rules responding to lagged data, with parameters other than ϕπ and ϕz set at baseline values.
Determinate equilibria may or may not be E-stable. Reprinted with permission from Bullard and Mitra (2002).react not to current or past data directly, but to
their own forecast of future developments, say,
one period in the future. This case can also be
analyzed, assuming that both the private sector
and the central bank learn in exactly the same way.
Bullard and Mitra (2002) calculate determinacy
and learnability conditions in this case and find
that the two criteria do not coincide when central
banks are forward-looking.14
In a closely related paper, Bullard and Mitra
(2006) consider the more complicated, but more
realistic, situation when the central bank also
includes a lagged interest rate in its policy rule,
(13)             
with ϕr > 0. They come to the conclusion that
policy inertia tends to improve the prospects for
both determinacy and learnability. This might
provide some part of an explanation as to why
empirical estimates of actual central bank behavior
put important weight on the lagged value of the
short-term nominal interest rate.15
Optimal Policy Rules
Svensson (2003) has argued that postulating
Taylor-type monetary policy rules, even with open
coefficients16 as in Rotemberg and Woodford
(1999), is not a satisfactory practice. Instead, the
monetary authority should be modeled as having
an objective that they wish to accomplish as best
they can with the instruments at their disposal
and under the constraints imposed on them by
the economic environment. Such an approach
would imply “a more complex reduced-form
reaction function” (Svensson, 2003, p. 14). One
could argue with this conception. By specifying
a class of linear policy feedback rules, the analysis
can isolate conditions for determinacy and learn-
ability for rules within the class—and then calcu-
rz r tt z t r t =++ −− − ϕπ ϕ ϕ π 11 1 ,
late an optimal rule from among the ones that
satisfy the determinacy and learnability condi-
tions according to any criterion one wishes to
ascribe to the policymaker. By specifying policy-
maker behavior according to a given objective first,
one risks specifying a policy rule that generates
indeterminacy, unlearnability, or both.
One example of this phenomenon occurs in
Evans and Honkapohja (2006 and 2003a,b). They
considered the economy described by equations
(1) and (2) but replaced (3) with an explicit opti-
mization problem for the monetary authorities to
solve. This problem can be viewed as policy-
makers attempting to maximize
(14)                 
where β is the discount factor used by policy-
makers (assumed to be the same as the discount
factor used by the private sector) and the relative
weight on output versus inflation is given by α,
with α = 0 corresponding to the “strict inflation
targeting” case.17 The inflation target is again
assumed to be zero. It is well-known that the first-
order conditions for this problem differ depending
on whether one assumes a discretionary central
bank or one that is able to commit to a superior
policy by taking a timeless perspective.18 Under
discretion the first-order condition is
(15)                         
whereas under commitment it is
(16)                   
Evans and Honkapohja (2006 and 2003a,b)
stress that one still needs an interest rate reaction
function to implement the policy, and, impor-
tantly, there are many such functions that will
implement the optimal policy under rational
expectations. Do all of these possible reaction
functions induce equilibria with the same deter-
minacy and learnability properties? In fact, they
κπ α tt t zz +− () = −1 0.
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22 βπ α ,
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17 Woodford (2003a) has argued that objective (14) approximates the
utility of the representative household, in which α takes on a
specific value.
18 See Woodford (2003a).
14 For a recent analysis of the related issue of constant interest rate
forecasts on the part of central banks, see Honkapohja and Mitra
(2005).
15 Typical estimates in the literature put the value of ϕr at 0.7 or even
0.9, depending on the country and the time period.
16 That is, without assigning specific numerical values. Rotemberg
and Woodford (1999) indeed found optimal policy rules, but
within classes of possible rules that look like the ones Taylor
discussed, such as (13).do not. One might consider the “fundamentals-
based” optimal policy—that is, an interest rate rule
that calls for instrument adjustments directly in
response to the fundamental shocks.19 One can
write down such a rule for either the discretionary
or the commitment case. The startling result of
Evans and Honkapohja (2003a) is that interest rate
reaction functions of this type invariably imply
that the equilibrium is unstable in the learning
dynamics. Equilibrium is also always indetermi-
nate. Evans and Honkapohja (2003b) label this
finding “deeply worrying,” and, indeed, the analy-
sis shows the dangers of proceeding naively from
the objective (14) to an implementable policy with-
out considering the effects of that policy on the
nature of equilibrium or the stability of the equi-
librium in the face of small expectational errors.
However, equilibrium can be rendered both
determinate and learnable with an alternative
interest rate feedback rule, as Evans and
Honkapohja (2003a) show. This alternative rule
still implements the optimal policy according to
the objective (14), but it does so in a way that
creates a determinate and learnable equilibrium.
The key is to augment the set of variables included
on the right-hand side of the feedback rule to
include private sector expectations of key variables
(the output gap and inflation) as well as the fun-
damental shocks of the model. This alternative
representation of the optimal policy rule is suc-
cessful in generating determinacy and learnability
because it does not assume the private sector has
rational expectations, instead allowing the central
bank to react to small expectational errors. Of
course, for this type of policy rule to be of impor-
tance in actual economies, one has to assume that
private sector expectations are observable.20
Learning Sunspots
With the rational expectations revolution
came the idea of sunspot, or nonfundamental,
equilibria, in which homogeneous expectations
are conditioned on purely extrinsic uncertainty,
that would not matter for the economy except
that agents do condition their expectations on it.
This idea has had considerable success as inter-
pretations of many macroeconomic events seem
to be consistent with the idea of self-fulfilling
expectations. A general finding in the theory litera-
ture is that sunspot equilibria exist when equilib-
rium is indeterminate, so that indeterminacy can
imply both the existence of multiple, fundamental
equilibria and also the existence of additional,
nonfundamental sunspot equilibria. But could
agents actually learn such equilibria, in the sense
we have described here? To do so, the agents
would need to have a perceived law of motion
that is consistent with the possibility of a sunspot
variable playing an important role.
In a classic paper, Woodford (1990)
addressed this question and argued that, indeed,
a simple recursive learning dynamic might lead
agents to coordinate on a sunspot equilibrium.
His environment was a version of the overlapping
generations model. Honkapohja and Mitra (2004)
carry out an analysis of the learnability of non-
fundamental equilibria in models like the one
described in equations (1)-(3). They find that the
Taylor principle continues to play an important
role in the learnability of nonfundamental equi-
libria. In their analysis, violations of the Taylor
principle tend to imply indeterminacy, and none
of the equilibria are learnable in those cases. Thus,
violation of the Taylor principle would seem to
imply that the private sector cannot coordinate
on a rational expectations equilibrium of any kind
in the context of the New Keynesian model.21
This idea turns out not to completely characterize
the situation, however. Evans and McGough (2005)
show that sunspot equilibria may indeed be learn-
able if one focuses on common factor representa-
tions of the sunspot solution.
The tendency in the monetary policy litera-
ture, and indeed in the macroeconomics theory
literature generally, has been to regard the case
of indeterminacy and possible sunspot equilibria
as a situation to be avoided at all costs. If a par-
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19 For one discussion, see Clarida, Galí, and Gertler (1999).
20 The Evans and Honkapohja (2006 and 2003a,b) results are sensitive
to the specification of the objective function. If one includes interest
rate deviations in the objective, E-stability can be achieved without
requiring the monetary authority to react to private sector expec-
tations. See Duffy and Xiao (2005).
21 Similar results occur in a real business cycle context with inde-
terminacy. The sunspot equilibria that exist there are generally
not learnable, as shown by Duffy and Xiao (2006).ticular policy generates indeterminacy, then in
the eyes of most authors the policy is not a desir-
able one, quite apart from any question concern-
ing learnability of equilibrium. A dissenter from
this view is McCallum (2003), who argues that
when multiple equilibria exist, only fundamental,
minimal state variable solutions are likely to be
observed in practice, and thus arguments based
on the mere existence of many nonfundamental
equilibria should be given less weight in the litera-
ture. A portion of his argument is that nonfunda-
mental equilibria are unlikely to be learnable. In
discussing McCallum, Woodford (2003b) argues
that, because in the indeterminate cases the
minimal state variable solution is also often not
learnable, as in the Honkapohja and Mitra (2004)
analysis, one should not rely solely on the minimal
state variable criterion in generating a “prediction”




The fact that Japan has experienced zero or
near-zero short-term nominal interest rates for
several years has rekindled ideas about liquidity
trap equilibria originally discussed in the 1930s.
Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2001) pre-
sented an influential analysis of this situation.
They argued that the combination of a zero bound
on nominal interest rates, commitment of the
monetary authority to an active Taylor rule (that
is, one that follows the Taylor principle) at a tar-
geted level of inflation, and a Fisher relation
generally implies the existence of a second steady-
state equilibrium. This second steady state is char-
acterized by low inflation (lower than the target
level) and low nominal interest rates in a wide
class of monetary policy models currently in use.
The Taylor principle does not hold at the low-
inflation steady state. They also showed, in the
context of a specific economy, the existence of
equilibria in which interest rates and inflation
are initially in the neighborhood of the targeted
inflation rate, but which leave that neighborhood
and converge to the low-inflation steady state.
From the perspective of the literature on expec-
tational stability, a natural question is, Which of
the steady-state equilibria presented by Benhabib,
Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2001) are learnable?
Based on the results presented so far, in which
the Taylor principle governs convergence under
recursive learning, one might expect that the tar-
geted, high-inflation equilibrium (in which the
Taylor principle holds) would be stable under
recursive learning, while the low-inflation equi-
librium would not be. Evans and Honkapohja
(2005) analyze versions of the Benhabib et al.
(2001) economy in which this logic generally
holds. The monetary authority in Evans and
Honkapohja (2005) can switch to an aggressive
money supply rule at low rates of inflation, and
this switch can support a third steady state char-
acterized by an even lower inflation rate. This
steady state can be learnable in their analysis,
and in this sense they find a learnable liquidity
trap. But if the monetary authority switches to
the money supply rule in support of an inflation
rate that is sufficiently high, then the economy is
left with only the targeted, relatively high-inflation
steady state as a learnable equilibrium.
Another analysis of this issue is by Eusepi
(2005), who also finds some instances of a learn-
able liquidity trap in a model with a forecast-based
interest rate rule. Eusepi (2005) also provides an
analysis of the nonlinear dynamics of this model
under learning. As a border of a stable region of
the parameter space is approached (say, as a par-
ticular policy parameter is increased), an eigen-
value crosses the unit circle, which is normally a
defining feature of a local bifurcation. The system
can then display cycles and other stationary
behavior in a neighborhood of the steady state.
Eusepi (2005) finds that this type of outcome
can occur in versions of the model studied by
Benhabib, Schmitt-Grohé, and Uribe (2001) under
learning.22 
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traps. A recent example is Adam, Evans, and Honkapohja (2006).The Role of Escape Dynamics
An alternative approach to low nominal
interest rate outcomes is studied in Bullard and
Cho (2005). Their model is linear and possesses
a unique equilibrium in which inflation is near
target at all times. To explain persistently, and
unintentionally, low nominal interest rates, they
design their model to produce an “escape” from
the unique equilibrium toward a nonequilibrium
focal point, which is characterized by low nominal
interest rates and low inflation. The systems they
study tend to return to the unique equilibrium
following these episodes of “large deviations.”
Thus, the Bullard and Cho (2005) approach to
low nominal interest rate outcomes does not
involve the economy being permanently stuck in
a liquidity trap. To generate the escape dynamics,
Bullard and Cho (2005) rely on the following fea-
tures: (i) The private sector has a certain misspeci-
fied perceived law of motion for the economy;
(ii) there is feedback from the beliefs of the private
sector to the actions of the monetary authority;
and (iii) the private sector uses a constant gain
learning algorithm, which puts more weight on
recent observations and less weight on past obser-
vations when obtaining key estimates of parame-
ters by means of recursive learning.
Students of escape dynamics will recognize
the elements just described from themes in Sargent
(1999), Cho, Williams, and Sargent (2002), Kasa
(2004), Sargent and Williams (2005), and Williams
(2001). The escape dynamics in a learning model
are interesting because they describe a situation
in which the economy is at or near rational expec-
tations equilibrium most of the time, but in which
rare events can endogenously push the economy
away from the equilibrium toward persistent non-
equilibrium outcomes. This may be quite valuable
in helping economists understand unusual, but
important, macroeconomic events, such as market
crashes or depressions.
One aspect of this type of analysis is that a
rare or unusual event precipitates the escape
episode. How rare is this event? In some analyses,
it may seem implausible to wait for such a rare
event to explain an important macroeconomic
outcome. However, McGough (2006) suggests that
in models that have escape dynamics, one may
not have to wait for the rare precipitating event
to occur to observe the escape dynamics. Instead,
the escape can be triggered by a shock to the under-
lying fundamentals of the economy. In a version
of Sargent’s (1999) economy, the shock is a plau-
sible shift in the natural rate of unemployment.23
The models with escape dynamics therefore have
a certain instability, which might be activated by
events other than the precise combination of
shocks within the model necessary to generate
an escape.
Learning and Structural Change
It has long been emphasized in economics
that for one-time, unanticipated developments,
learning makes a great deal of sense and rational
expectations is inappropriate. That is, for struc-
tural change or other important, one-time shocks,
the most appropriate analysis would include
transitional learning dynamics as private sector
and government officials learn the new equilib-
rium. The empirical evidence on the existence of
structural change in macroeconomic time series is
quite strong. For instance, most macroeconomic
time series display a reduction in volatility after
1984, according to standard tests.
There is a rational expectations approach that
one can take to study problems of this kind, such
as the one used by Andolfatto and Gomme (2003).
One can postulate that a key feature of the econ-
omy follows a regime-switching process, with
given transition probabilities. One can then com-
pute optimal behavior of the agents in the econ-
omy, given that underlying fundamentals may
switch between two regimes. A full-information,
rational expectations approach would endow the
agents with knowledge of the current state along
with the probability transition matrix and allow
them to make optimal decisions given the uncer-
tainty they face. A more realistic approach, and
the one used by Andolfatto and Gomme (2003),
asks the agents to infer the regime using available
data and knowledge of the transition probabilities.
The agents can solve this signal extraction prob-
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23 See Ellison and Yates (2006) for an alternative explanation of the
timing of the escape dynamics described by Sargent (1999).lem optimally using Bayesian methods, and this
is sometimes thought of as a type of “learning”
analysis. However, in the context of the macro-
economic learning literature, this approach is
really one of rational expectations given informa-
tion available to the agents in the model.24
The rational expectations regime-switching
approach is interesting, even brilliant, because it
transforms an otherwise nonstationary problem
into a stationary one, allowing the researcher to
maintain a form of the rational expectations
assumption. But I do not think this method is the
right one for most types of structural change. Most
of the shocks we think we observe are one-time
permanent events, widely unexpected, such as
the productivity slowdown from the 1970s to the
1990s in the United States. The nature of the event
is that the current status quo changes permanently,
but not to any well-defined alternative status quo.
The new reality is learned only after the event
has occurred. For this reason, I think subjecting
available models to one-time permanent shocks,
and allowing the agents in the model to learn the
new equilibrium following the shock, is a better
model of the nonstationarity we observe in the
data. Of course, for recursive learning to tend to
lead the economy toward the new equilibrium, the
new equilibrium must be expectationally stable,
and this expectational stability must extend to a
wide enough neighborhood that the permanent
shock does not destabilize the economy com-
pletely.
To implement this type of learning the litera-
ture has turned to constant-gain learning, inspired
by the discussion in Sargent (1999). Most learning
algorithms have today’s perceptions as yesterday’s
perceptions plus a linear adjustment that is a
function of the forecast error from the previous
period. The coefficient multiplying the forecast
error would typically be 1/t, to give equal weight
to all past forecast errors. But an agent suspicious
of structural change may wish to downweight past
forecast errors and put more weight on more
recent forecast errors. A simple method of doing
this is to change the gain from 1/t to a small posi-
tive constant. A more sophisticated method is to
use a Kalman filter or a nonlinear filter.25 The
agent is then able to track changes in the environ-
ment without knowing exactly what the nature
of those changes may be. Productivity growth
may not simply be switching between high and
low, but may visit many other regimes, some of
which may never have been observed. The track-
ing idea equips agents with methods of coping
in such an environment. It may well be a better
model of structural change in the types of prob-
lems macroeconomists try to analyze.
For examples of economies with structural
change and learning dynamics as I have described
it, see Bullard and Duffy (2004), Bullard and
Eusepi (2005), Lansing (2002), Milani (2005),
Orphanides and Williams (2005), and
Giannitsarou (2006).
RESOURCES ON THE WEB
In this paper, I have provided a limited survey
of some of the issues and recent results in the
macroeconomics learning literature. Much of this
literature has provided commentary on monetary
policy issues. The learnability criterion is just
beginning to be widely used to assess key aspects
of policy that have been difficult to address under
a pure rational expectations approach.
This survey is far from comprehensive.
There are many closely related issues that I have
not attempted to address here. As of this writing,
interested readers can consult the web page main-
tained by Chryssi Giannitsarou and Eran Guse at
Cambridge University, “Adaptive Learning in
Macroeconomics,” which provides a more com-
plete bibliography with up-to-date links:
www.econ.cam.ac.uk/research/learning/.
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